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IN the year 1633, Galileo was summoned by the Office of the Inqui-
sition from Florence to Rome, there to submit himself to a catechetical
examination by a court of Cardinals. The heresies of which he was
"vehemently suspected" pertained to doctrinal matters, though scien-
tific rather than religious or political. Galileo had advocated and ex-
tended the forbidden cosmology of Copernicus and had, in effect, dis-
credited the "official" cosmology of Ptolemy.
The outcome of this historic event is well known. Galileo was forced
to abjure his heretical opinions; but the Inquisition treated him "with
a consideration unexampled in its history" and the punishment inflicted
upon him was comparatively mild. Science had all but won that free-
dom which it was shortly to attain, and which it was to enjoy in increas-
ing measure for two centuries while it grew powerful in influence and
opulent in prestige.
In the main, this freedom was established as a by-product of the
process by which other freedoms-of religious worship, of speech, of the
press, of assembly-were won. The crucial battles were fought on other
fronts, and the freedom of scientific communication emerged as a natu-
ral corollary of the general principle established in this struggle-that
neither lay nor ecclesiastical authorities could impose their conformities
on the conscience and critical intelligence of man.
By the middle of the nineteenth century the general cause of free-
dom seemed definitely won, and if the principle was not universally
established, it was at any rate firmly in the ascendant. To be sure,
there were interludes of shadow and eclipse. In the realm of science,
facts, the "fortifications of reason", were not always sufficient bulwark
against the forces of bigotry and reaction. But on the whole, progress
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wav steady, and the persistence of doctrines which aimed valiantly at
the petrification of institutions and the fossilization of thought was
viewed as a minor aberration certain to be corrected in time.
, The rise of the fascist dictatorships ended once and for all whatever
complacency we had on this score. The scope of their triumphs, the
bitterness of the battle required to defeat them, the legacy they have
left behind them, all warn us that freedom is not a gift which, once won,
can be taken for granted.
Measures for the suppression of fundamental freedoms imposed with
such ruthlessness and such efficiency by the fascist states were all
justified in their philosophy by the traA scendant importance of the
nation. In a world reduced to a struggle to the death between compet-
ing national organisms, there was no room for the individual conscience,
no excuse for personal dissidence, no reason but reason of state. Any
dissent from the single will of the leader who alone divined the ultimate
goal of the state was held to be weakness, and when nations must strug-
gle ceaselessly for survival, weakness is fatal.
Amidst the general destruction of individual freedoms which this
philosophy encompassed, scientific freedom was not spared. Science
was dragooned and regimented and made to serve the master's ends.
Scientists either made their terms with the state, or suffered expulsion
or liquidation.
Indeed, when men believe the existence of their society to be at stake,
no other fate for dissenters is possible. When the democracies embarked
upon total war, the measures they felt it necessary to take in ordering
science and circumscribing communication among scientists were
scarcely less complete than those imposed by the fascists. In both world
wars, the scientists of the United States, of the United Kingdom and
of other democratic countries had to accustom themselves to work
under regulations of secrecy in an atmosphere of darkness. This fact
was brought out clearly in an address before the National Academy of
Science by Sir Henry Dale, former president of the Royal Society of
England :1
". .. [I]n 1918, most of the scientists, like most of the warriors,
returned joyfully to normal life and normal standards with the hope
that such a call would never come again. When this hope proved
vain, the call was for science and scientists as never before, to meet
the new threat from an enemy who had already enlisted most of the
science of his great nation in secret preparation for an attack on the
world's freedom. And to meet this menace, we free peoples found
ourselves obliged to submit again to the invasion of our scientific
activities by secrecy, to a degree beyond any which had so far been
regarded as possible. Secrecy percolated into domains which all
1. Pilgrim Trust Lecture: The Freedom of Science; Washington, D.C.; Oct. -22,
1946.
[Vol, 56: 769
1947] CONTROL OF INFORMATION TO ATOMIC ENERGY 771
earlier wars had held sacred; so that we, for example, whose work
was in the medical sciences found ourselves involved in an incon-
sistency, which still paid conventional respect to that immunity of
medical equipment and personnel which a more scrupulous age had
established, but compelled us, in the name of total war, to throw a
veil of secrecy over the new discoveries which could make their
work of mercy really effective. To all this and much more we
loyally submitted. And now that science has done its part, and
the war has been won, we look for the freedom that victory was to
insure. Do we find it? Or do we find science still wearing its war-
.time fetters, in the interests of a right assumed for any nation, at
peace, to make secret preparation for the destruction of its neigh-
bors? . .
The melancholy observations of Sir Henry are completely justified
by the information section of the Atomic Energy Act.2 If the Act does
not restrict the liberty of scientific thought, it without question abridges
freedom of scientific communication. The controls on information were
deliberately designed to regulate the interchange of scientific ideas; to
prescribe when and how a scientist may publish or otherwise communi-
cate the results of his work. And the penalties for violation of these
prescriptions are drastic. The data whose communication the Act seeks
to regulate are not exclusively technical and military in character, nor
are they necessarily data compiled by federal workers utilizing federal
funds. Even those data describing the phenomena and laws of the visi-
ble universe are under interdict; and even data independently arrived
at in private laboratories are subject to control.
INFORMATION CONTROLS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS: THE PROBLEM
OF "SECRECY"
Scientific progress depends on the free flow of ideas-assured by the
freedom to publish, to communicate and to exchange views by personal
contact-among scientists the world over. Every scientist builds on
the achievements of his predecessors and contemporaries; more often
his own work is brought to fulfillment by the work of his successors.
Unique proof of the complete interdependence of all scientific activities
is found in the winning of atomic energy, a scientific and technological
achievement to which scientists from so many different countries con-
tributed that it may be regarded as a prototype of international co-
operation.
Laws controlling the dissemination of scientific information, however
skillfully formulated, cannot be made sufficiently flexible and selective
to avoid disrupting this symbiotic relationship among scientists and
2. 60 STAT.,755, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (Supp. 1946) (hereafter cited by section only).
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retarding to some extent the natural growth of science. This is a flaw
characteristic of legal machinery, although it arises not infrequently in
other disciplines. In medicine, for example, the conquest of a particular
disease often hinges on finding a drug which will destroy the bacillus
but not the patient.
While it may be possible to safeguard information against coming
into the possession of foreign scientists and thus reduce leaks to coun-
tries which may be our enemies in future wars, this cannot be achieved
without restricting the free exchange of ideas among our own scientists.
Is there, then, a middle way which science and national security can
travel together without seriously impeding each other? Many of our
leading scientists believe not.3
The question remains, moreover, have information controls any
value? Can they be enforced? Since this is open to serious doubt, it
may be the point should have been considered at the outset. For if
either we have no secrets to keep or could not keep those we have, other
aspects of the matter would become more or less academic. Thus our
presentation of the issues may come perilously close to Bertrand Rus-
sell's sad example of compound arguments: "I was not drunk last night.
I had only two glasses of beer. Besides, it is well-known that I am a tee-
totaler."
To begin with, what subjects can effectively be kept secret? The
Concise Oxford Dictionary gives as examples: "treaty, understanding,
errand, door, passage, sin, process, arrival, influence." The facts about
the physical universe are evidently not included. Mr. Churchill has
referred to the release of atomic energy as a "secret long mercifully with-
held from man." The expression is as felicitous as it is eloquent. For
the secret has been withheld from man, meaning all men, not merely
Germans, Frenchmen, Russians, or Porto Ricans.
The use of the word "secret" for the results of scientific investigations
is unfortunate and misleading. A dream or an unuttered idea are ex-
amples of things which can be kept secret if their possessor does not
choose to reveal them. "On the other hand, if I say, 'I know the critical
mass of U-235 necessary to make a bomb, and I intend to keep it secret',
I am using the word 'secret' in an entirely different sense. I am saying
to you, not that you cannot find out what I know, but that you must
3. See, e.g., the testimony of Louis N. Ridenour, Professor of Physics at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. "In the radar field, we started with the, same atmosphere of
secrecy, the same precautions about compartmentation of information and clearance of
individuals, which characterized the atomic bomb project right to the end, and still char-
acterize it today. However, we did away with most secrecy before the end of the war.
.At the end of the war, the Army was publishing a magazine on radar with a circulation
of over 12,000. It had become by that time apparent that secrecy cost in efficiency far
more than it gained us by keeping the enemy in ignorance." Hearings before Special
Senate Committee on Atomic Energy Pursuant to S. Res. 179, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
536 (1945).
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find it out for yourself, without my help. This may cause you to become
annoyed with me, but it cannot keep you in ignorance." 4
This is not to say that restrictions on the disclosure of the new basic
discoveries or of technical processes, such as those involved in separat-
ing the isotope U-235, may not lengthen the period required by other
nations to gain this knowledge. So the question becomes, not Shall we
keep the secrets of atomic energy?-that is impossible; but rather, Will
the control of atomic information in the United States delay other na-
tions enough to warrant the resulting impairment of our own research
and of international comity?
In reaching a judgment on this question, three factors must be taken
into account. First, it is essential to recognize that once it is disclosed
that a technical device has been developed in one country, even if de-
tails regarding it are withheld, the search becomes easier for other coun-
tries. The knowledge that a problem can be solved is an important aid
to others seeking a solution, both in a psychological sense and in helping
to eliminate fruitless lines of inquiry. This applies to fundamental, as
well as applied research, and was well-illustrated in the development of
atomic energy. Once it became known that a chain reaction could be
sustained, that the neutron "reproduction factor" could be made to
exceed 1, or that U-235 could be separated by various methods in sub-
stantial quantities5 the task for other countries seeking to develop their
own methods for getting at atomic energy was perceptibly lightened.
They had assurance that the problem could be solved and were able to
concentrate their efforts on approaches of proven value. The point is
well, though perhaps somewhat naively brought out by an incident fa-
mous in the history of science; it relates to a visit paid to John Napier,
soon after his invention of logarithms, by Henry Briggs, then (1614)
professor of geometry at Oxford. Briggs' first words were: "My lord,
I have undertaken this long journey purposely to see your person, and
to know by What engine of wit or ingenuity you came to think of this
most excellent help in astronomy viz logarithms; but, iny lord, being by
you found out I wonder nobody found it out before, when, now known, it is
so easy."
Second, the general principles underlying all processes are likely to be
widely known being derived usually from some discovery of basic
science. For example, the successful gaseous diffusion method of sepa-
rating U-235 was based on identical principles enunciated by Lord Ray-
leigh as early as 1896. Thus, it is only the latest improvement or modi-
fication of an existing technique which can be held in camera, and then
only for an indeterminate but usually brief period. Moreover, there is no
4. Id. at 537.
5. All of this information vas officially established by the Smyth report. See
Su=, Aromc EsN-m roR Muxr~rA Pumosns (1946).
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likelihood whatever, with all our preeminence in technology, that the
disparity between the level of our technical competence and that of
other industrialized countries-at least half a dozen could be named
(e.g. Great Britain, Canada, Russia, France, Sweden, Czecho-Slovakia)
-is such that the latter would be more than, at most, a few years
behind us. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that other nations fre-
quently develop technological methods and processes distinctly superior
to ours in a variety of fields.
Even wholly new processes are likely to be already known or simul-
taneously discovered in other countries. For intellectual progress, espe-
cially in the sciences, is more or less uniform in countries which for gener-
ations have shared the same cultural climate. Only a small fragment of
our own scientific ideas are likely to be original, and that fragment is
likely to be of little value by itself. One would not assume that biolog-
ical evolution functions differently in Des Moines, Copenhagen and
Moscow. The likelihood of marked differences in the evolution of
scientific thought corresponding to geographical differences is equally
small. Doubtless, some nations show special aptitudes in one field, some
in another, but the community of science has long been international
and the objects of its search are universal.6
6. On this point, we again have the testimony of Louis Ridenour.
"This is really the crux of the argument. If we can hide nothing perma-
nently by scientific secrecy, then it is clearly undesirable, for it slows our own
progress. Scientific history is full of coincidences-of cases in which two or more
men, in different parts of the world, have reached the same result and inde-
pendently of one another's work and at the same time. Dr. A. H. Compton, an
outstanding figure in the work on the atomic bomb, was awarded the 1927 Nobel
Prize in physics for his discovery of what is now called the Compton effect-
the inelastic scattering of light quanta by free electrons. In Holland, this is called
the Debye effect, because Compton's explanation of his experiments was given
independently by Debye at the very same time.
"The Russian physicist, Gamow, and Gurney and Condon-the same Dr.
Condon who is scientific adviser to this Committee-gave independently and at
the same time an explanation of the phenomenon of alpha-particle disintegra-
tion of the radioactive elements. The very phenomenon of nuclear fission, it-
self, the basis for the atomic bomb, was only foreshadowed by the work of Hahn
and Strassmann in Germany. The hypothesis of a violent splitting of the ura-
nium nucleus was independently proposed and verified by Frisch in Copenhagen
and by Joliot in Paris. The suggestion that plutonium would be a suitable ex-
plosive for an atomic bomb was made in this country by Prof. L. A. Turner.
The Smyth Report points out that the same idea occurred independently to the
British physicist Cookcroft, and Turner has told me that Von Halban, working
in France, had the same idea at the same time.
"Two promising new devices for the acceleration of electrons and atomic
nuclei to high energies were invented last fall by two young American scien-
tists. One, called the synchrotron, was invented by McMillan, at Berkeley; an-
other, the microtron, by Schwinger, at Harvard. In the Summer, 1945, issue of
the Journal of Physics of the U.S.S.R., a Russian physicist named Veksler pub-
[Vol. 56: 769
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Finally, the cosmopolitan character of the atomic energy project
should not be forgotten. This work was the product of the scientific
brains of several of the allied nations, and participating scientists in-
evitably acquired a considerable measure of the specialized and tech-
nical knowledge required to produce the bomb. It must be assumed
that any "secrets" known by these scientists, many of whom have re-
turned to their own countries, have been disclosed to fellow-workers in
nuclear physics in other parts of the world.7
Congress, nevertheless, decided that the dangers of free speech in
nuclear science and related technologies could not be risked. And,
having reached this conclusion, there remained the questions: 'What
information was to be restricted? Under what circumstances might
U. S. scientists exchange restricted information? How should viola-
tions be punished?
The answers to these questions appear in section 10 of the Atomic
Energy Act.
STATUTORY STATEMENT OF POLICY
As a preamble to the main provisions of the control of information
section, the Act recites two statements of policy, interesting mainly for
their political significance.
Exchange of Informration with Foreign Nations. Pursuant to the
lished a paper describing these two devices. Though the scientific shades had been
down between Russia and the United States during the war, after five years we
find Russians and Americans doing the same things, in the same way, at the
same time...
"In my own wartime field of radar there were many e.xamples of the same
kind. Radar itself was independently invented by the Germans, the French, the
British, the Japanese, and ourselves. Each of these nations kept it secret from
all of the others, not knowing to what little point this was done. Microwave ra-
dar, which has played such a great role in the allied victory, -as made possible
by a single invention, the cavity magnetron. This is a transmitting tube which
gives previously unimaginable amounts of power on wavelengths far shorter than
those available to radio engineers before the war. It was invented by the British.
When the British sent a scientific mission over to this country in the late sum-
mer of 1940, one of the most impressive of the secrets they had to show us was
the cavity magnetron. When the radiation laboratory was first set up, an attempt
was actually made to keep knowledge of the magnetron localized in one group
of the laboratory, not even letting the men who were working on a modulator to
energize this tube know of the tubes design. Yet, all this time there -was in the
Russian literature a paper which exmctly described the cavity magnetron, and
gave the results of ex-periments with it."
Hearings before Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy Pursuant to S. Res. 179,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 537-8 (1945).
7. The statement of Professor Marcus Oliphant, a distinguished Australian scientist,
leaves little doubt on this point. He said that the United Kingdom "knew all there was
to be known about producing bombs because her scientists had worked with the United
States in the development."
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overriding consideration of "defense and security," data on atomic
energy with respect to its use for industrial purposes shall not be ex-
changed with other nations "until Congress declares by joint resolution
that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use
of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established. .. ." 8
This language is similar in purport to certain declarations contained
in the joint Truman-Atlee-King statement of November 15, 1945, on
the international aspects of atomic energy.9
The statement plainly reveals the determination of Congress to
safeguard all the "secrets" of atomic energy-including those relating
solely to its industrial use. Since the production of power by nuclear
processes requires either the production of fissionable material or the
"burning" of fissionable material as nuclear fuel, Congress appears to
have adopted a reasonable position. Note, however, that the text under
consideration makes no reference to the possible exchange with other
nations of technical data relating to other aspects of atomic energy
even after "effective and enforceable international safeguards" have
been established. Although no undue significance should be attributed
to this omission, it reemphasizes the concern of Congress with the
protection of the "secrets" and its unwillingness at the time to make
any commitments as to conditions under which the resumption of free
scientific intercourse would be permitted.
To be sure, other provisions of the Act may be thought to contradict
this inference. For example, Section 8 provides that if international
arrangements for the control of atomic energy are achieved, any provi-
sions of the Act inconsistent with such arrangements "shall be deemed
to be of no further force or effect." But since such arrangements must
first have the approval of Congress, it is evident that Congress will
have ample opportunity to consider the entire question of exchanging
scientific data with other nations and deciding whether such exchange,
or the relinquishment of atomic information to an international author-
ity meets the requirements of defense and security as then determined by
Congress.
Encouragement of Free Interchange of Ideas. American scientists,
particularly physicists, throughout the period that the McMahon-
Douglas Bill was before Congress, made their influence felt not only in
public statements, but directly in seeking out key members of Congress
for the purpose of explaining and urging the point of view of those
engaged in research as a profession. While the "atomic scientists," as
they called themselves (demonstrating thereby a finer appreciation of
the journalists' art than of the niceties of English usage) had a serious
interest in the bill as a whole, their closest attention was focused, as
8. Section 10 (a) (1).
9. Reprinted in SEN. Rai'. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 33-5 (1946).
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might be expected, on the research provisions and on the section deal-
ing with the control of information. Section 10 reveals in several im-
portant provisions the success of their advocacy.
For example, Section 10(a)(2) provides that the dissemination of
scientific information should be "permitted and encouraged so as to
provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential
to scientific progress." Considered in conjunction with the balance of
the section and the general provisions of the Act respecting research, it
appears to assert a precept for the Commission of a priority compara-
ble to the other policy directions which are set forth elsewhere in the
Act. The existence of this policy statement deprives the Commission
of the politically comfortable expedient of making defense and se-
curity exclusive considerations. Politically safe though such a position
might be, its effect would be dangerous to the national security as %,ell
as intolerable to the working scientist.
MECHANICS OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
The actual mechanics of the system of controls over information
established by Congress in the Act are quite simple. Certain kinds of
information relating to atomic energy are denoted as "restricted
data." 10 The Commission alone determines which of the restricted
data shall be removed from this category and thereafter freely dis-
seminated. Restricted data may not be communicated or transmitted
without incurring certain penalties in the event that acts of communica-
tion or transmission are perpetrated "with intent to injure the United
States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation," 11
or, in certain instances, where the perpetrator, though innocent of
such intentions has "reason to believe" 12 that injury to the United
States or advantage to a foreign power will be the consequences of his
action.
While the mechanics are simple, the concepts are not; nor is the
interpretation and application of the several provisions free of serious
difficulties and dangers. Let us proceed to examine some of the major
parts of the control machinery in somewhat greater detail.
I Restricted Data. Restricted data are defined as "all data concerning
the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of
fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production
of power .. ." 13
Dominated by considerations of caution Congress constructed this
definition so as to embrace practically all significant data relating to
10. Section 10(b) (1).
11. Section 10 (b) (2) (A).
12. Section 10 (b) (2) (B).
13. Section 10 (b) (1).
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atomic energy. Its manifest intention was to make the term "restricted
data" an all-inclusive category from which the Commission might
remove classes of information on its own responsibility and in con-
formity with the general security standards set forth in the Act.
The first portion of the definition raises no serious problem. Informa-
tion respecting the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons is
almost exclusively of military value and should obviously be subjected
to strict control. The other portions of the definition, however, are not
so readily disposed of.
Information as to the production of fissionable material, a very loose
and broad concept, embraces much that is of general importance to
fundamental as well as applied research. If private research in this
area is to contribute effectively to the future development of atomic
energy, it will be necessary to keep channels of communication open
between the laboratories of government and those of university and
private industry. The Commission must, therefore, reconcile objec-
tives of opposite tendency: the maintenance of secrecy and the pro-
motion of vigorous and fruitful research. So long as the present temper
prevails, the Commission will feel powerful pressures to refrain from
declassifying data, until they are generally known, in part at least, as a
result of publication by other countries. Tempting as this policy will
prove, it is to be hoped that the Commission will reject it, for if the
United States publishes little other than what is already known, other
countries will follow the same course, and the rate of scientific progress
will be greatly retarded. The larger the area which is maintained as
restricted, the greater will be the responsibility of the Commission to
encourage the free exchange of information among our own scientists
and between federal and non-federal laboratories.
The third category of restricted data encompasses "the use of fis-
sionable material in the production of power." In the event of an
agreement between nations to set up an international development
authority, the information function in this, as in other categories, will
be altered radically. Even in the absence of an international agree-
ment, however, the provisions of the Act relating to the production of
power and associated controls over information must be considered if
the denaturing process referred to in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 14
can be rendered truly effective.
Insofar as the fields of atomic power and of fissionable material
production overlap, restrictions on dissemination of information relat-
ing to the former are obviously justified. However, scientists who have
worked in the field have repeatedly asserted that a variety of useful
data on power production could be released without the revelation of
14. A Report on the Infernational Control of Atomic Energy, H. R. Doc. No. 709,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946).
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significant data on the production of fissionable material. The only
justification for prohibiting communication in this area, consequently,
is that it relates to the nation's economic potential, and as such has
economic significance. There can be no quarrel with the general
proposition that economic potential is ultimately convertible into
military effectiveness, but if this is the rationale for a policy restricting
the dissemination of information, then clearly there are many other
categories which must be included as well: coal mining, steel produc-
tion, electrical engineering, automobile manufacturing, chemicals-
the list could be extended indefinitely. The policy followed by the Com-
mission in this area will thus have implications of broad significance,
and it is of considerable importance that it should not appear to en-
dorse the principle that data should be withheld merely on the grounds
that it relates to the nation's general economic potential and thus,
ultimately, to its military strength.
As indicated above, the three categories of restricted data are sweep-
ingly inclusive in scope. Unfortunately, a detailed enumeration of
categories of restricted information was not feasible. Such a catalogue
would have been unwieldy apart from the fact that its publication
would have revealed certain information which it had been decided
must for the present be kept secret. That Congress intended informa-
tion within the restricted categories to be released at the Commission's
discretion is, of course, evident from the express language in the latter
part of Section 10(b)(1). 15 The Senate Special Committee, moreover,
was at pains to study the declassification procedures followed by the
Manhattan District in issuing documents such as the Smyth Report,
and to incorporate in the Act itself the principles employed there.
What areas of information clearly lie outside the scope of restricted
data as above defined? Much fundamental information in the field of
nuclear physics does not appear to be caught up in the control net. But
to dispel doubts and to relieve physicists of the intolerable fear that
publication of every research finding is a violation of the Act, the Com-
mission will be well-advised to publish explicit and detailed catalogues
of types of data nwt included in the restricted category. These cata-
logues must be kept up-to-date and made available promptly to all
research laboratories. Exempt information would also include an
immense amount of medical data in relation to radioactivity and radio-
active substances; technological information on the mining and refining
of source materials; chemical and engineering data and similar informa-
tion.
Final authority for removing data from the restricted category lies
15. "..but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time
determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and secu-
rity.
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with the Commission."8 If another agency of the Federal Government
should attempt to apply its own interpretation of what data lie within
the restricted category, intolerable confusion would result. To guard
against this possibility, Section 10(b)(6) expressly states that "no
government agency shall take any action under . ..other laws in-
consistent with the provisions of this section." The Senate Special
Committee Report interprets this provision as prohibiting "any agency
from placing information in a restricted category under the authority
of this or any other law once such information has been released from the
category by official action of the Atomic Energy Commission." 17
Types of Offenses and Prescribed Penalties. Having defined "re-
stricted data", the Act proceeds to set forth the actions involving its
communication, acquisition, or alteration which invoke criminal pen-
alties if committed (1) with intent to injure the United States; (2) with
intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation or (3) with reason
to believe that injury to the United States or advantage to a foreign
nation will result from the act.
The prohibited actions are clearly stated and raise no problems of
interpretation. They can be briefly disposed of before an analysis of
the more difficult problem of the intent with which such acts are com-
mitted is undertaken.
The first group of prohibitions is directed against the communica-
16. There is some legal basis for concluding that publication in any form of such
data may operate to remove it from the scope of controlled information. To be sure, the
only cases which have been decided arose under the Espionage Act. 40 STAT. 217 (1917),
50 U.S.C. § 31 (1940). But a judicial holding as to what is and what is not an official
secret, the unauthorized disclosure of which justifies criminal proceedings, must be judged
as relevant to the interpretation of any statute providing for the control of information in
the interest of national defense. In United States v. Heine, 151 F. 2d 813 (C.C.A, 2d
1945), the court held that the defendant could not be punished under the Espionage Act
for communicating information of military significance to a foreign nation where the in-
formation had previously been publicly released or not withheld and, therefore, was
publicly available, even though there was clear evidence of the defendant's bad intent.
Relying upon legislative debates emphasizing an intent to prohibit communication only of
"secrets," the court interpreted the Act to exclude non-secret information. From the
standpoint of endangering the national defense, once information has been made public,
even if unlawfully, the harm, if any, has been dbne and those responsible for the initial
publication should bear the brunt of the punishment.
Even apart from the interpretation announced in the Heine case, it may be unconsti-
tutional to prohibit communication of publicly available information. Secrecy controls
rest upon the war powers and may supersede the first amendment guaranteeing freedom
of speech only if necessary to the waging of war or the national defense. In Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Supreme Court rephrased this test in terms of
whether or not the prohibited utterances constituted a "clear and present danger" to the
nation's safety. It is at least possible that the courts will declare this requirement not met
by utterance of information which is already publicly available.
17. Smx. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). See discussion infra pp. 790-
801 showing the relation of this provision to the Espionage Act.
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tion of information in documentary form or orally. The Act provides
that whoever "communicates, transmits, or discloses any document,
writing, sketch, photograph, model, instrument, appliance, note or
information involving or incorporating restricted data" with intent to
injure the United States shall upon conviction be punished by death or
imprisonment for life, provided this is the reconmmendation of the jury; if
the jury does not recommzend death or life imprisonment the maximum
penalties are 20 years imprisonment and a fine of $20,000.1 The same
act committed with intent to secure an advantage to a foreign nation is
punishable by a maximum of 20 years imprisonment and a $20,000
fine, and if committed without intent but with reason to believe that
injury to the United States or advantage to another nation might
result, the punishment is limited to ten years and a S10,000 fine.12
Although the penalties of death or life imprisonment are evidently
reserved for the most flagrant offenses and require an express recom-
mendation by the jury, it should be noted that they may be meted
out even in peacetime. This contrasts sharply with the penalties of the
Espionage Act 2 -a maximum of 20 years' imprisonment-for similar
offenses under similar circumstances. Note further that the prohibition
applies to illegal traffic in restricted data whatever their source-
whether produced on federal projects or in private laboratories. Assume
the case of scientist A, working in a government laboratory, who, hav-
ing gained access to restricted data, passes the data on to B with intent
to injure the United States. A will be prosecuted and may either suffer
imprisonment up to 20 years, or, in the extreme case, the jury may
recommend the sentence of death or life imprisonment. The penalties
are severe, but they are probably justified by the nature of the crime-a
treasonable act on the part of a public servant entrusted with official
secrets.
But assume that A works in a private laboratory, has no official
connection with the government and uses no federal'funds. Assume
that A independently makes a discovery and publishes results which
incorporate restricted data. If on A's trial the jury finds that publica-
tion was with intent to injure the United States, he may also receive
the death penalty if the jury so recommends. Moreover, either the
government or the private scientist may receive a maximum of 10 years'
imprisonment for committing the offense without any specific intent to
injure the United States if it appears that he had reason to believe his
act would result in injury to the United States or benefit to a foreign
power.
In effect, therefore, the Act abolishes to a considerable degree pre-
18. Section 10(b) (2) (A).
19. Section 10 (b) (2) (B).
20. 40STAT.217 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 31 (1940).
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vious distinctions between public officials and private individuals, and
between "official secrets" and data independently arrived at.
The second group of prohibitions is directed against the acquisition
or attempt to acquire restricted data in documentary form or orally.21
Whoever, with intent to injure the United States, "acquires or attempts
or conspires to acquire any document, writing . . . involving or in-
corporating restricted data" is punished by death or life imprisonment,
if the jury so recommends; otherwise, the maximum penalty is 20 years'
imprisonment and a fine of $20,000. The latter sentence is also pre-
scribed for a similar act committed with intent to secure an advantage
to any foreign nation. No one, however, may be convicted of these
offenses unless actual intent to injure the United States or give ad-
vantage to a foreign power is proved. Constructive intent, i.e. "reason
to believe," will not, as in the case of communication of restricted data,
suffice for a conviction.
The third group of prohibitions rests upon a hybrid concept partially
related to restricted data, partially to what might be called sabotage.
It is provided that whoever "removes, conceals, tampers with, alters,
mutilates or destroys any document, writing . . . used by any in-
dividual or person in connection with the production of fissionable
material, or research or development relating to atomic energy, con-
ducted by the United States, or financed in whole or in part by Federal
funds, or conducted with the aid of fissionable material, shall be pun-
ished" by death or life imprisonment if committed with intent to injure
the United States provided this is the recommendation of the jury.
22
If the jury does not recommend death or life imprisonment, or if the
act is committed with intent to advantage a foreign nation, the max-
imum penalty again is 20 years' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine.
It is reasonable to make punishable the offense of mutilating or
destroying plans and documents incorporating restricted data and
representing the fruits of nuclear research in government laboratories,
although the death penalty seems an unduly severe measure to apply,
But to make the same action a capital offense under certain attendant
circumstanceg even where committed in a private laboratory seems to
reflect an unreasoning fear bordering on hysteria.
Indeed the draconic sweep of all these penalties reveals Congress'
obsession with the safeguarding of secrets. The unprecedented provi-
sions which prescribe the death penalty in peacetime for such an offense
as "mutilating" a "sketch" relating to research onlatomic energy par-
tially financed by federal funds can be ascribed only to superstitious
dread. Terror of the atomic bomb is natural and understandable-
perhaps even healthy; but terror at the loss of the "secret" is a tribal
21. Section 10 (b) (3).
22. Section 10 (b) (4).
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fear which, once gaining ascendancy in our minds, must inevitably
weaken rather than strengthen our defensive power as a nation. Pre-
occupation with the "secret," instead of with the thing itself, vill stifle
the scientific research from which our real strength is derived, will
strengthen the pernicious misconception that we have a monopoly of
knowledge in the science of atomic energy, and will beguile us into em-
bracing the fatal fallacy that we can achieve security for ourselves by
keeping our knowledge from others.
THE PROBLEM OF INTENT
Intent to Injure the United States. What is meant by committing an
act "with intent to injure the United States"? The phrase is no pal-
impsest, yielding unsuspected meanings upon careful analysis. Read
in the present context, an intent to injure the United States is pre-
sumably an intent to weaken its relative military strength by com-
municating data of military significance to a potential enemy. It is
not certain whether this includes economic data, or, if it does, what
range of such data. The answer must await judicial determination.
Unfortunately the precedents are meager and perhaps not even in
point. Debate in Congress over the Espionage Act, which uses similar
language,2 3 seemed to indicate the general belief that the word "injury"
xelated solely to military injury.2 4 But this really brings us little far-
ther. A military injury is presumably an injury respecting military
plans or equipment. But what, in turn, are these? Decisions under
the Espionage Act are, moreover, of limited weight in interpreting
terms used in the Atomic Energy Act, partly because it was the clear
intent of Congress, as evinced by the drastic penalties to treat atomic
energy as a special and unique category; partly because in the Espion-
age Act, "restricted data" is defined as "information respecting the
national defense," an even vaguer compendium than the loose defini-
tion accorded it in the Atomic Energy Act; and finally because the
Espionage Act is plainly intended to protect only what might be termed
"official secrets." Nevertheless, the influence of the First Amendment
to the Constitution in interpreting the Espionage Act is likely also to be
felt in judicial definition of "intent" under the Atomic Energy Act.
Intent to Advantage a Foreign Nation. Linked with the concept of
"intent to injure the United States" is that of "intent to secure an
advantage to any foreign nation." Even before the "one world" con-
cept came into vogue, it might have been argued that any act which
gives advantage to a foreign nation in the sense of strengthening its
23. ".. . with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation...." 40 STAT.
217 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 31 (a) (1940).
24. See 54 CoNG. R. 3595 (1917).
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military potential, would create a balance of military power less fa-
vorable to the United States, and thus constitute an injury to this
country.
In United States v. Heine,2 however, Judge Learned Hand indicated
that the phrase "injury to the United States" as used in the Espionage
Act is not as broad as. "advantage to a foreign nation." He wrote
"while it is true that it is somewhat hard to imagine instances in which
anyone would be likely to transmit information . . . which would be
injurious to the United States, and yet not advantageous to a foreign
power, it is possible to think of many cases where information might be
advantageous to another power, and yet not injurious to the United
States." 2 In this statement we have one of the few guideposts, if
judicial precedents' under the Espionage Act can be so considered, to
the scope of the phrase "advantage to any foreign nation."
The Atomic Energy Act indicates on its face that Congress used the
phrase "intent to give advantage to a foreign nation" to connote a less
grave circumstance in connection with unlawful dissemination of re-
stricted data than "intent to injure the United States." For an offense
to be punishable by death or life imprisonment, the Act requires it to
have been "committed with intent to injure the United States." 1 The
legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act does not contribute
significantly to determination of its meaning. The Senate Special Com-
mittee rejected the proposal to modify the phrase "advantage to any
foreign nation" by inserting the word "military" before "advantage." 21
From this it may be inferred that "advantage to any foreign nation"
is not to be regarded merely as an alternative or reciprocal method of
expression for "injury to the United States," if the latter is construed
as meaning "military" injury.
It is manifestly impossible to prove "intent," i.e., a state of mind,
except by outer, observable circumstances. Objective evidence of
intent to give a military advantage to a foreign nation is most likely at
the same time to be evidence of intent to injure the United States mil-
itarily. It is permissible therefore to infer that it was not the purpose
of Congress to exempt from the death penalty or life imprisonment
anyone who communicated information with the intent of giving a
military advantage to a foreign nation. Exceptions to this rule of
thumb are conceivable, but are not likely to have practical weight in
judicial proceedings. We may note as one example, the case of the
British scientist, Alan Nunn May, sentenced to prison in 1946 for
transmitting to a foreign nation restricted information of military value
25. 151 F. 2d 813 (C.C.A. 2nd 1945).
26. Id. at 815.
27. Sections 10(b) (2) (A), 10(b) (3), 10 (b) (4).
28. See N. Y. Times, May 2, 1946, p. 5, col. 4.
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relating to atomic energy.29 May readily confessed to the charge, but
advanced in defense, such arguments as the right of scientists of all
nations to communicate freely. Under the Atomic Energy Act, it
would have been possible for M\ay's counsel to argue that while May
had intended to give valuable military information to a foreign nation,
and thus to confer a military "advantage" on that nation, it was not
his intention to "injure" his own country. But it is doubtful whether
this argument would have persuaded either court or jury in May's
favor.
Suppose, however, that the "foreign nation" which a defendant is
accused of having advantaged, is regarded by the United States as a
friendly nation, which in all probability would neither betray the in-
formation thus gained to a nation "unfriendly" to the United States.
nor, in the event of a future war, be other than our ally. May the
court or jury take notice of this fact of real-politik and thus conclude
that the offender under no circumstances intended to "injure the
United States"? Might this fact be regarded as a complete excuse of
the defendant's offense? In other words, is the giving of an advantage
"to any foreign nation" to be considered in light of which foreign
nation actually was the beneficiary of the advantage? It is unlikely
that the courts would go so far in construing the phrase, yet one may
venture the guess that the punishment for the offense would be miti-
gated considerably if the foreign nation to which the information was
given were a "friendly" or "popular" or "non-aggressor" nation.
Now if intent to give a military advantage to a foreign nation is
almost tantamout to intent to injure the United States, what are the
less grave circumstances which Congress intended to fall within the
"advantage" category alone? It is probable that useful economic data,
especially such data relating to atomic power, would be interpreted as
conferring an advantage on a foreign nation; it is less likely that medi-
cal culture information would be included unless there were some clear
military or economic significance to the particular data revealed.
Much, however, will depend upon the prevailing political climate, the
state of international relations, the effect of these on the judicial
process, and the policies of the Commission in interpreting the defini-
tion of restricted data and in removing data from this category.
"Reason to Believe." Certain offenses, as noted above, are punishable
even if there is no evidence of intent of either type, as long as the in-
dividual unlawfully disseminating restricted data had "reason to be-
lieve such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure
an advantage to any foreign nation." 2
"Reason to believe," is, if anything, a more cryptic phrase than
those examined above. Lawyers, however, are soothed by such jargon
29. Section 10 (b) (2) (B).
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which serves to convey ideas more deeply felt than understood. Reason
to believe invokes the judgment of the ordinary reasonable man-a
standard somewhat lacking in objective exactitude, but one to which
men learned in the law instinctively turn.
It is fair to predict that prosecutions grounded on dissemination
with "reason to believe" are most likely to be directed against scientists
who inadvertently publish restricted data in a journal or monograph,
against journalists publishing such data in newspapers, and agairst
anyone having the misfortune to misjudge the character, the loyalty
or the discretion of another to whom he has communicated restricted
data. But these by hypothesis, are all men innocent of any deliberate
intent to engage in treasonable activities. At most they may be in-
discreet. It is justifiable to punish carelessness and indiscretion con-
cerning atomic data with severity-since data so revealed is as dan-
gerous to the national security as that given away by deliberate treason;
nevertheless, punishment should be limited to those who have been
guilty of carelessness and indiscretion, and this guilt should be demon-
strable by objective standards.
Since one may infer that data in the restricted category are per se
deemed capable, if improperly disseminated, of inflicting injury on the
United States or conferring an advantage on a foreign power, proof
that the data communicated lay within the restricted category would
no doubt create the presumption that it was conveyed with reason to
believe it would inflict injury on the United States or confer an ad-
vantage on a foreign power.
A scientist engaged on private research in nuclear physics must,
therefore, keep fully informed regarding all interpretations and regula-
tions issued by the Commission pertaining to the scope of restricted
data. Only by so doing can he ascertain whether or not he is free to
publish the results of his research. However, since it is manifestly
impossible for the Commission to list even by title each category and
sub-category of information subsumed under the definition of restricted
data, partly because of the dimensions of the task, partly for reasons of
security already mentioned, the private scientist can never be certain
that the information he intends to publish lies outside the scope of
restricted data. In questionable cases, therefore, he would be well
advised to submit his report or monograph to the Commission for
security clearance before publication. The Commission should estab-
lish a staff unit to review promptly all material submitted for this
purpose.
Consider now, two possibilities. If the Commission decides the data
are free of security restrictions, that ends the matter and the scientist
is free to publish his findings in any way he sees fit. If on the other
hand there is a ruling that the research findings contain restricted data,
the scientist who has discovered the information cannot publish it.
[Vol. 56: 769
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But if the matter were to end here science would soon expire for lack of
circulation and interchange of life-giving ideas. The scientist in ques-
tion will find it necessary to communicate his findings to colleagues in
the United States who are engaged in the same work and, therefore,
have a vital interest in any advances which are made. At this point he
is compelled to embark on a perilous venture. For while he is not
forbidden to communicate restricted data to others, he must not only
avoid laying himself open to a charge of acting with intent to injure
the United States or to give an advantage to any foreign nation, but
he must also be careful that he is not open to a charge that he had
reason to believe that these consequences might result from his acts.
In theory, at least, an innocent man would run little risk of being
charged with an intent to injure the United States or advantage a
foreign country, but anyone communicating restricted data must
regard the "reason to believe" provision as a treacherous bog in his
path. A scientist who communicates restricted data to his colleagues
must be certain that they are loyal, trustworthy, and non-subversive;
that they are fully acquainted with the control of information section
of the Atomic Energy Act, and with regulations relating to restricted
data issued by the Commission; and that in addition to being loyal and
versed in the law, they are also discreet and keep good company.
This is, unfortunately, not a neurotic caricature of what the scientist
faces when in the interest of scientific progress (or for any other reason)
he takes it upon himself to impart restricted information. For it is easy
to see that anyone, whose transmission of restricted data turns out
badly, must face the possibility of prosecution for communicating with
"reason to believe" that injury to the United States or an advantage
to a foreign nation would result because the recipient of the informa-
tion was (as would be alleged) well-known for his "disloyal views,"
"subversive tendencies," "reputation for indiscretions," and "disloyal
acquaintances." It is, in other words, insufficient to guard one's own
morals; one must also judge the loyalty, patriotism and discretion of
those with whom one communicates and run the risk of imprisonment
if this judgment should prove erroneous.
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10
Commission Must be Advised Before Criminal Action Taken. Viola-
tion of any of the prohibitions just reviewed is a criminal offense, sub-
ject to prosecution in the federal courts. Ordinarily, all such prosecu-
tions would be brought by the local United States Attorney, subject to
internal supervision by the Department of Justice in Washington. The
Atomic Energy Act, however, contains a novel provision directing that
no prosecution be commenced except upon the direction of the Attorney
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General and then only after the Attorney General has advised the Com-
mission with respect to the prosecution.30
The Senate Report explains this provision as "an assurance to
scientists working in atomic energy fields that prosecutions would not
be initiated without review by persons having the technical and sci-
entific background necessary to determine the significance of the acts
complained of." 31 The House debates over the legislation suggest a
further reason.3 2 Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, in urging
defeat of the House Military Affairs Committee's efforts to delete the
provision, justified it as an essential safeguard 'against precipitate ac-
tion by local United States attorneys, the guarantee of a 'cooling-off'
period during which, it is hoped, the more detached judgment of the
Attorney General can be obtained. "A scientist's reputation," said
Mrs. Douglas, "is severely injured by the mere initiation of prosecu-
tion, regardless of whether or not he is ultimately acquitted." 83 Sci-
entists, now that their work has cast them into the volcano of con-
troversy, must unfortunately expect to be the victims of the universal
tendency to hasty judgments, almost impossible to eradicate by
rational evidence. As the old saw has it: People think last what they
thought first. The Commission as a matter of simple justice, apart
from the dictates of enlightened self-interest, must not overlook any
steps which would tend to reduce the risks to reputation and personal
freedom that scientists working in atomic energy will face. Nor can it
afford wholly to disregard the statement made by a group of the leading
nuclear physicists that unless they could continue their work in peace,
they would abandon their preoccupation with the inanimate atomic
nucleus and turn their energies to the study of lepidoptera, a more
secure if less exciting activity.
Investigation of Personnel. As a further means of protecting restricted
data, the Act contains unique provisions to assure the integrity of per-
sonnel working on atomic energy matters. All contractors and licensees
of the Commission are required to agree in writing not to permit any
individual to have access to restricted data until an investigation of
the "character, associations and loyalty of such individual" has been
made by the FBI and a determination made by the Commission that
access by such person will not "endanger the common defense or
security." 14 It may be noted that disregard of this clearance is only a
breach of contract, not a criminal violation. Of course, if restricted data
should in fact be illegally communicated, the contractor or licensee
30. Section 10(b) (5) (A).
31. SEN. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess, (1946).
32. 92 CONG. EGa 9470 (1946).
33. Id. at 9471.
34. Section 10(b) (5) (B) (i).
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might be guilty of conspiracy 35 but additional evidence would un-
doubtedly be required to sustain such a charge.
For Commission employees, the Act requires an FBI investigation
before hiring.36 Similar investigations for government employees are
customary and are often completed before the employee reports for
duty. The provision is unprecedented, however, in making prior in-
vestigation a statutory requirement. Some flexibility is afforded the
Commission in the power to hire without waiting "in case of emer-
gency."
To bridge the temporary period in which investigations are being
conducted, any individual permitted access to restricted data by the
Manhattan District may be allowed to continue in this position of
privilege and any present or former employee of the Mlanhattan Dis-
trict may be employed by the Commission.,
One point merits emphasis. For all employees of the Commission,
as well as employees of contractors and licensees, the final determina-
tion as to qualification for employment, including such elements as
character and loyalty is made by the Commission. It has been the
standard practice of the Federal Government to have the FBI investi-
gate and report, with the final determination in each case left to the
employing agency's discretion. While in the majority of instances the
Commission would undoubtedly reject an applicant for employment if
the FBI commented on him unfavorably, it would be a dangerous
precedent to subordinate the judgment and authority of the agency
responsible for the program to that of the FBI.
Use of Services of Other Ageycies. To assure that all possible steps are
taken to prevent unlawful dissemination of restricted data, including
guarding of physical property and equipment, the President is expressly
authorized to use the services of all government agencies "to the extent
he may deem necessary or desirable." 31 This provision must be taken
to apply especially to the monitoring and policing facilities of the mil-
itary departments during the transition period while the Manhattan
District is being taken over by the Commission, and before the Com-
mission is staffed to perform these functions independently.
Inspections and Records. The Commission is expressly authorized to
require reports to be made and records to be kept of atomic research
under Section 3, and of licensed activities under Section 7 of the Act.'
It is also authorized and directed to inspect such activities on its own
initiative "as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act."
35. Section 10 (b) (2) (A).
36. Section 10 (b) (5) (B) (ii).
37. Section 10 (b) (5) (B) (iii).
38. Section 10 (b) (5) (B) (iv).
39. Section 10 (c).
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With respect to the production of fissionable material incident to
research, the Commission is directed to make frequent inspections and
to require reports and records.
These provisions serve the dual purpose of enabling the Commission
to perfect its control over these activities and of assuring that the
Commission is promptly informed of new developments in the study,
manufacture and use of atomic energy.
THE INFORMATION SECTION AND THE ESPIONAGE ACT
Reference has earlier been made to Section 10(b)(6), which pro-
vides: "This section shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any
other laws, except that no government agency shall take any action
under such other laws inconsistent with the provisions of this section."
The phrase "applicable provisions of any other laws," while general,
must be read as pointing particularly to the Espionage Act. 40
Until the adoption of the Atomic Energy Act, and thus throughout
the entire period of the Second World War, the Espionage Act, passed
in June 1917, and subsequently amended, was the only statutory source
of the controls invoked to protect data concerning the atomic bomb, the
production of fissionable material and the very existence of the Manhat-
tan Project and all its activities. In the earliest stages of drafting legis-
lation for the development and control of atomic energy, it was realized
that the provisions of the Espionage Act were unsuited in several re-
spects for dealing with the secret data of theoretical and applied nuclear
physics. The control of information provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act were not merely designed to plug certain gaps in the Espionage Act;
they were designed with the object of satisfying as far as possible the
desires of scientists to escape the stultifying restrictions on the exchange
of information to which they had been subjected by the Manhattan
District. Although in certain respects more comprehensive and more
stringent than the Espionage Act, the Atomic Energy Act provided a
framework within which the scientists felt they had some chance of op-
erating effectively, however hazardous their personal lives might be-
come. On the other hand they were convinced that an extension of the
information practices of the Manhattan District, based on the Espion-
age Act, would in the long run smother all creative activity in the field
of nuclear research.
If, therefore, Section 10(b) (6) is so construed that the Espionage Act
remains in force for private research, as well as governmental activities,
the scientists have, indeed, sustained a crushing defeat and the more
moderate and enlightened information provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act are little more than pietisms. It is reasonable to assume that no
40. 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 31 (1940).
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such interpretation will be imposed; nevertheless, there remains a for-
midable problem in integrating and reconciling the provisions of the
two Acts. For the Atomic Energy Act clearly cannot be considered to
have supplanted the Espionage Act, and on certain major points, the
two measures appear to be directly in conflict. Skillful administration
and careful judicial consideration will be needed to reconcile the appar-
ent inconsistencies and to effect the evident intent of Congress-regard-
less of the labyrinth of confusion that inadequate drafting has created.
To arrive at the heart of the difficulties, it is necessary now to exam-
ine the provisions of Title I of the Espionage Act and to show, step by
step, where conflicts may arise between the two laws and how these may
be reconciled without doing violence to either.
Information Respecting the National Defense. While the information
section of the Atomic Energy Act makes some effort to define the crucial
subject matter of "restricted data," the only reference to this subject in
the Espionage Act is the phrase "information respecting the national
defense." A review of judicial decisions (which are meager) and of the
legislative history (which is inconclusive) furnishes both a negative and
a positive criterion for evaluating "information relating to the national
defense." United States v. Heine4 ' seems at least to establish the prin-
ciple that "information relating to the national defense" cannot be in-
formation publicly available. The opinion goes on to say that the infor-
mation must be "secret" although the term is not precisely defined.
The legislative debates on the Espionage Act furnish ground for con-
cluding that only "official secrets" were intended to be covered by the
Act.42 Vague as this term is, it is, nevertheless, of considerable impor-
tance in defining the scope of the Espionage Act and in reconciling ap-
41. 151 F2d 813 (C.C.A. 2nd 1945).
42. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Overman in debate over S. 8148 (the parent bill
of the Espionage Act) in which he asserted that the bill meant "secrets." 54 Co:;o. REc.
3489 (1917). Later he referred to "our secrets in regard to national defense" Id. at 3586.
Furthermore, the Senator foreshadowed the precise holding of the Heine case when he
stated that where information "had been made public property" there would be no offense.
Id. at 3597. It is interesting to note that thi- statement was nowhere cited in Judge
Hand's opinion nor in the briefs of counsel.
Further support for the view that the Espionage Act referred only to "official
secrets" a be found in the House report on H.R. 291 where it is stated that "... it is
important that the Commander in Chief shall have authority to prevent the publication of
national defense secrets, which would be useful to the enemy.. .. H. PR. RP. No. 30,
65th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1917).
Doubts as to this interpretation were e.x-pressed by Senator Cummins, though not
concurred in by Senator Overman. See 54 .CoxG. Rmc. 3485 (1917). Compare Senator
Cummins' remarks on the broad implications with United States v. Heine, 151 F2d 813
(C. C. A. 2nd 1945), which denies that the Espionage Act has equally broad application.
[The above footnote is based on material prepared by Nathaniel H. Goodrich of the New
York Bar].
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parent conflicts with provisions of the Atomic Enefgy Act, as will
appear presently. /
The other leading court decision 43 under the Espionage Act is not
conspicuously helpful in defining information relating to the national
defense. National defense is stated to be a "generic concept of broad
connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and
the related activities of national preparedness." Evidently this is not
Ariadne's thread to guide us out of the labyrinth.
Types of Offenses and the Prescribed Penalties under the Espionage Act.
(A)Section i(a) of the Espionage Act recites an offense for which there
is no counterpart in the Atomic Energy Act: that of entering upon any
government installation (e.g. vessel, aircraft, navy yard, arsenal) or up-
on any other restricted territory vital to the manufacture and shipment
of military equipment (e.g. coaling station, canal, railroad, factory) or
upon any other place "connected with the national defense, owned and
constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States ..."
for the purpose "of obtaining information respecting the national de-
fense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be ob-
tained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advan-
tage of any foreign nation. . . ." By Section 6, the President is given
power in time of or national emergency to designate any place other
than those set forth above as a "prohibited place," for purposes of this
title.
The prohibition, insofar as it relates to "entering upon" the places
named, is in all respects unaffected by the Atomic Energy Act. How-
ever, the fact that the large majority of prohibited places are federal
installations or places directly involved, by contract or otherwise, with
the Federal Government in activities relating to the national defense
is relevant insofar as it tends to strengthen a view that the Espionage
Act is concerned mainly with government-owned or government-
produced data.
The offense of "obtaining information" relating to the national de-
fense from any such place, as distinguished from entering upon prohib-
ited places for the purpose of obtaining such information, in a measure
overlaps Section 10(b)(3) of the Atomic Energy Act. Prosecutions
involving "restricted data", (which might also be considered "informa-
tion relating to the national defense") would, therefore, in all probabilty
invoke the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, if for no other reason
than that the maximum penalties under this Act are death or life impri-
sonment in one set of circumstances, and 20 years imprisonment or a
fine of $20,000 in another, as against a maximum of 10 years impri-
sonment and a $10,000 fine in any circumstance under the Espionage
Act.
43. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1940)."
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Note, however, that under the Espionage Act, "obtaining informa-
tion" with "reason to believe" that the information will be used to
injure the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation is a
punishable offense which has no counterpart in the Atomic Energy Act.
Which law will prevail if the restricted data of atomic energy are in-
volved? While a judicial decision is evidently required to settle the
issue a prosecution under Section 1(a) of the Espionage Act for obtain-
ing restricted data on atomic energy "with reason to believe" would
seem contrary to the intent of Congress. Omission of "reason to be-
lieve" from Section 10(b) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act, in light of the
use of the same term elsewhere in the Act, appears deliberate.
(B) Section x(b) provides a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment and
a fine of $10,000 for the offense of copying, making, taking, or obtain-
ing--or inducing or aiding another to do so-of any specified thing such
as a document, sketch, or blueprint, connected with the national
defense, with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation. This offense is similar to that for which Section 10(b) (3)
of the Atomic Energy Act provides severe penalties. A distinction of
which much has been made lies in the fact that the Espionage Act for-
bids the acquisition of documentary information only, while the Atomic
Energy Act seals this crevice by adding the phrase "or information."
But this point seems overemphasized. Suppose, for example, A mem-
orizes or induces another to memorize the content of a map or docu-
ment 44 containing information respecting the national defense, intend-
ing to use such information to the injury of the United States. It seems
doubtful that such an action would be immune from the operations of
the Espionage Act.
Again, it should be noted that the Espionage Act, unlike the Atomic
Energy Act, makes acts within the prohibitions of this section pun-
ishable if performed "with reason to believe," as well as "with intent."
The comments on this point under (A) above are applicable here.
(C) Section x(c) applies the same penalties as those of Section 1(b)
to the offense involving any of the above-mentioned kinds of docu-
mentary information by anyone knowing or having reason to believe
that it has been or will be used by any person contrary to the provisions
of the Act. This is a curious provision substantially overlapping Sec-
tion 1(b), and has no counterpart in the Atomic Energy Act.
(D) Section x(d) is of particular importance. It provides that "who-
ever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control
over, or being entrusted with, any document, writing, code book, signal
44. There come to mind at least two famous fiction cases involving these circum-
stances: "Mr. Memory" in JOHw BUcHA,, 39 STws; A. Co,;AN Dovmn, THS Bnucz-
PARTNGTON PLANTS.
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book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,
model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense,
willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or
transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully
retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or em-
ployee of the United States entitled to receive it .. . shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more
than 10 years, or both."
There is no counterpart for this provision in the Atomic Energy Act,
but it should be considered in relation to Section 10(b) (2). First, there
are the usual differences in the severity of the punishment, already
mentioned above. Second, Section 1(d) makes no reference to intent to
injure the United States or to give advantage to any foreign nation;
nor, of course,' is there mention of the accompanying circumstance of
"reason to believe." The Atomic Energy Act, on the other hand,
enumerates offenses under both attendant circumstances in sections
10(b)(2)(A) and 10(b)(2)(B). The language of Section 1(d) of the
Espionage Act is "willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to
communicate." Without entering upon a legal-semantic analysis of
the word "willful," and its uses in the law, it is fair to infer that as used
in this context it is a flat prohibition against communicating regardless
of intent or reason to believe. The only exempted communications would
be those made under duress, or in a somnambulistic state, or by an
insane person. This interpretation of the intent of the provision is
strengthened by the fact that what is prohibited is the communication
"to any person not entitled to receive it." (emphasis added).
Section 1(d) omits the word "information" from its catalogue of
prohibited transmittances and communications-an omission to which
some significance may be attributed in view of the inclusion of the word
in other sections. Shall section 1(d), therefore, be limited in interpreta-
tion to control over the disposition of documentary information or
other vehicles incorporating data related to the national defense? The
language of the Act itself makes such a conclusion unlikely. It is made
unlawful to "communicate" documents, models, sketches, or plans.
Since physical objects clearly cannot be imparted by "communica-
tion," the provision becomes meaningful only if the prohibition extends
to the information contained or incorporated in the document, model,
sketch, or plan, as well as to transmittal of the physical objects them-
selves.
The legislative history of the Espionage Act only partially supports
the view that Congress believed information contained or incorporated
in the objects listed to be under the same interdict as the objects them-
selves, even though the word "information" was omitted from sec-
tion 1(d). The word was included in earlier drafts of the'bill 4 and
45. S. 8148, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1916) ; S. 2, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
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when a draft omitting "information" was brought to the floor of the
Senate, the omission was questioned. Senator Overman, managing the
bill on the floor, stated that in the opinion of the draftsmen, express
inclusion of "information" was unnecessary because the bill was already
broad enough to cover it: "I think everything is covered in the bill
without putting in those words here. The Committee thought that
those words are unnecessary in this place." 11
It may be admitted that this does not immediately resolve all doubts;
nevertheless, the balance of the evidence, logical, philological, and
historical, appears to support the view that "information" lies within
the scope of section 1 (d), even though not specifically mentioned.
Section 1(d) prohibits the communication or transmission of any
document "to any person not entitled to receive it," and makes an
offence of "willfully" retaining surh a document or faling to "deliver
it on demand to the officer or employee entitled to receive it." This
is by far the strongest element in proof of the proposition that at least as
far as communication and transmission of data are concerned, the
Espionage Act is intended to control only official government secrets.
The use of the bare phrase "entitled to receive it,'' unqualified by any
other standard for determining what class of persons is thus entitled,
points to the conclusion that only "officers and employees of the United
States," subject to the procedures for classifying authorized persons
applied by their own agencies, could have been intended; and to the
further conclusion that the subject matter involved could only be
official government secrets or government information.
Here again, the legislative history is inconclusive. The correspond-
ing section of H.R. 291, one of the parent bills of the Espionage Act,
was expressly limited to information "belonging to, intended for, or
under the control of the United States." S. 2, another parent bill, also
referred to "information belonging to the government, or contained in
the records or files of any of the executive departments . .. to which
no person unless duly authorized shall be lawfully entitled." On the
other hand, the absence of any such clear-cut language in the Espionage
Act itself may lead to the inference that the term "inforrfiation" is not
of such limited scope.
In United States v. Gorin, 41 the Court in holding certain other sections
of the Espionage Act constitutional said that "information relating to
the national defense" is not too vague a description of forbidden sub-
ject matter, in view of the fact that to obtain a conviction under the
sections involved, it was necessary to show that the offender had
mischievous intent or had "reason to believe" that the consequences of
his actions would adversely affect the national defense. But in sec-
46. 55 CONG. RFC. 778 (1917).
47. 312 U.S. 19 (1940).
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tion 1(d), neither intent nor reason to believe need be proven. From
the reasoning in the Gorin case, it would appear that section 1(d) would
be unconstitutional if construed to make a criminal offense of the mere
"willful" communication of "information relating to the national
defense," without either intent to injure the United States (or ad-
vantage any foreign nation) or reason to believe that such would be the
consequences of the communication, since in this situation the vague-
ness of "information relating to the national defense" would not be
offset by a requirement that intent be proven. On this principle, a
conviction under section 1(d) for communication without "intent" and
without "reason to believe" could be sustained only if the vague and
essentially undefinable concept "information relating to the national
defense" is construed, so far as section z(d) is concerned, to mean in-
formation for example belonging to the government, or contained in
the records or files of any of the executive departments. For on that
interpretation, even if intent (or reason to believe) were lacking, the
prohibited information would be so clearly describable that one could
not plausibly assert that section 1(d) failed wholly to meet the neces-
sary standards of definiteness and comprehensibility required for penal
statutes.
(E) Section x(e) describes the offense of misdelivering or losing any
document, plan, code, book, photograph, model or information "relat-
ing to the national defense" or of "permitting the same to be removed
from its proper place of origin . . . or to be stolen, abstracted or
destroyed"..."through gross negligence." [emphasis added.] The offender
must be one "entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of"
any such information, documentary or otherwise. The maximum pun-
ishment is ten years' imprisonment, $10,000 fine, or both. Neither
intent nor reason to believe are ingredients of this offense: it is predi-
cated upon gross negligence. Furthermore it clearly is limited to
officials or employees of the government (including government con-
tractors) since persons in this class would be "entrusted with or have
lawful possession or control of" the information in question. It is
conceivable that someone not in this class might have "lawful posses-
sion" but this would be the rare and exceptional case.
There is no provision of the Atomic Energy Act corresponding to
Section 1(e). Section 10(b)(4) describes, among others, the offense of
"mutilating or destroying" any document containing or incorporating
restricted data, but intent to injure the United States or give advantage
to a foreign nation must be an attendant circumstance. The offense is
not limited to persons "entrusted with or lawfully in possession or
control of" the restricted data.
It is clear that the offense described in section 1(e) of the Espionage
Act is applicable to the restricted data of atomic energy, but judicial
determination is required to describe the class of persons to whom its
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prohibition extends. This class includes government officials, em-
ployees, and contractors, anyone officially entrusted with restricted
data by an executive department of the Federal Government, and per-
haps anyone working on a project financed in whole or in part by fed-
eral funds, but private, non-federal activities in the field of atomic
energy, (e.g. research and development, industrial) should not be
within the scope of section 1(e). The loss, for example, through gross
negligence of restricted data (information relating to the national de-
fense within the meaning of the Espionage Act) by a scientist engaged
in private research in nuclear physics would not be a punishable action
within the meaning of section 1(e) of the Espionage Act. On the other
hand, if a government scientist loses, through gross negligence, a docu-
ment with which he has been entrusted, containing restricted data
withih the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act, he would certainly be
liable to punishment under section 1 (e).
(F) Section 2(a) provides a maximum penalty of 20 years' imprison-
ment for the communication or transmittal (or inducing another to do
so) of documents, sketches or of information relating to the national
defense, to the government, representative, or subjects of any foreign
state. The action must be taken with "intent or reason to believe that
it [the information] is to be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of a foreign nation." The same offense, committed in
time of war, is punishable by death or by imprisonment for not more
than 30 years.
This is the gravest offense, as may be inferred from the severity of
the punishment, described in the Espionage Act. The same offense
would be covered by sections 10(b)(2)(A) and 10(b)(2)(B) of the
Atomic Energy Act, where if the action is committed with intent to
injure the United States, it carries a penalty of death or life imprison-
ment upon recommendation by the jury; otherwise maximum punish-
ment is 20 years or $20,000. If committed with "reason to believe,"
the maximum punishment is 10 years or $10,000. The corresponding
sections of the Atomic Energy Act are more sweeping in the sense that
to ground the offense the communicant need not be a "foreign nation,"
or an agent or subject thereof, and more stringent, in that the death
penalty may be invoked even in time of peace; they are less stringent
in that where the offense is committed with "reason to believe," the
penalty in time of peace is 10 years as compared to 20 in the Espionage
Act, and even in time of war the death penalty is not applicable.
It is reasonable to suppose that Congress did not intend to give the
prosecuting attorney the option of moving under the Espionage Act
instead of the Atomic Energy Act where an offense involving informa-
tion relating to atomic energy is specifically described in the latter and
only broadly and generically encompassed by the former. On the other
hand this judgment creates an intellectual predicament. Its acceptance
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might mean that while the disclosure of information relating to the
construction of a machine gun, may, under given circumstances, be
punishable by death, the disclosure of information relating to the exact
construction of an atomic bomb, would not, under the same circum-
stances, be punishable by more than 10 years' imprisonment. But in
spite of its anomalous consequences the conclusion seems inescapable.
When Congress adopted Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act it in-
tended to prescribe the exact punishment to be applied for all violations
involving the unlawful dissemination of restricted atomic energy data.
And, in stating in Section 10(b) (6) that the applicable provisions of other
laws were not to be excluded, it meant to guard against possible omis-
sions, rather than to give a prosecutor the option of proceeding under
other laws against offenses fully covered by the Atomic Energy Act
for the sole reason that under such other laws these offenses! bore
heavier penalties.
RECONCILING THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND THE ESPIONAGE ACT
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the information sec-
tion of the Atomic Energy Act does not wholly supplant Title I of the
Espionage Act; neither can it be maintained that it merely supple-
ments the Espionage Act. The relation of the provisions of the two
statutes was apparently not adequately studied at the time of their
drafting, with the result that there are areas in which the Atomic Energy
Act appears to supplement the Espionage Act, areas in which it appears
to duplicate it, and areas in which it seems to contradict it.
The difficulties of this ambiguity of relationship are real, and if we
are destined to live in a world of international tension and warlike
preparation, they will doubtless become important. The problem which
will confront the Commission, the Department of Justice and the
courts will be how best to reconcile the two Acts so as to do least vio-
lence to the obvious intent of Congress while preserving as nearly
intact as possible the logic and the letter of the law.
Unfortunately the most direct solution-that of holding the Espio-
nage Act superseded wherever it conflicts with the Atomic Energy Act
as regards the control of information relating to atomic energy-is fore-
closed. The Act explicitly provides that the "applicable provisions"
of other laws are not superseded by the control of information section.
Although the Espionage Act is clearly not repealed explicitly, it may
be argued that at least some ofits provisions are repealed by implica-
tion so far as the restricted data of atomic energy is concerned. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has in a fairly recent decision reaffirmed a
doctrine of judicial interpretation which appears to rule out this possi-
bility.
48
48. "It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not
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The repeal doctrine, therefore does not offer a certain avenue of
escape from the difficulties we have described. Nonetheless, we cannot
wholly discard the possibility that in certain areas of conflict-notably
those where the same action is subject to wholly different degrees of
punishment in the two Acts-the courts may hold that a repeal by
implication has been effected.
There remains, then, the task of ascertaining the principal points of
conflict between the two Acts, and determining whether any possible
way out of the difficulty can be found in each case.
Differing penalty provisions: The difference can only be resolved by
judicial decision. Fortunately, this raises problems within judicial
proceedings as such and does not pose any difficulties or dilemmas for
the Commission in administering the Act.
Identical actions punishable under differing circumstances: For exam-
ple, some actions are punishable under the Espionage Act when com-
mitted with "reason to believe," while the same actions are punishable
under the Atomic Energy Act only when "intent" is proved. Here, too,
reconciliation is a matter for the courts. Note, however, that judicial
decisions clarifying the point are of considerable importance to the
practicing nuclear physicist. If he is assured that his good reputation
and his proven loyalty and integrity will constitute adequate defense
against a charge which requires reasonable proof of intent, the average
scientist will not suffer unending dread when engaged in nuclear re-
search. On the other hand, the knowledge that actions committed in
all innocence may be punishable on the theory that they were per-
formed with "reason to believe" that injury to the United States
would result, cannot fail seriously to affect the vigor and initative of
independent research. It is too much to expect of even the most law-
abiding physicist that he become an expert in avoiding every pitfall
and quagmire of two complicated laws. This situation must inevitably
work to the disadvantage of those scientists who as average men mind
their own affairs and do not bother themselves unduly with legal
vagaries.
The category of authorized persons: If the offense of communicating
information to a person "not entitled to receive it," dealt with in
section 1(d) of the Espionage Act, is construed to extend to private
research in nuclear physics, the intent of Congress as expressed in the
favored. When there are two Acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to
both if possible.... The intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and mani-
fest'.... It is not sufficient . . . 'to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even
all of the cases provided for by [the prior act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or
cumulative, or auxiliary.' There must be 'a positive repugnancy between the provisions of
the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication
only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."' United States v. Borden Co., 303 U.S.
188, 198 (1939).
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Atomic Energy Act, to forbid the Commission to "regulate or prescribe
who may disseminate or receive" restricted data will be defeated. This
problem, of primary importance to the Commission in the development
of its research policy and in daily administration of the Act, lends it-
self, however, to a workable solution already foreshadowed in earlier
discussion. It is submitted that the Espionage Act, at least as far as
section 1(d) is concerned, applies to information belonging to the gov-
ernment, or contained in the records or files of any of the executive
departments. If this provision is interpreted broadly, one may suppose
it to include information produced, not only within the Federal Gov-
ernment itself, but to data concerning or produced by government
contractors or on projects financed iri whole or in part by federal funds.
It would follow, therefore, that any government department has
the right to prescribe by regulation, or otherwise: (1) which of its own
employees, officials, consultants, etc., shall have access to "information
relating to the national defense," including, of course, such of the re-
stricted data of atomic energy as may come within the purview of that
particular department; and (2) which of the persons engaged on private
projects financed in whole or in part by federal funds supplied under
contract by that department shall have access to "information relating to
the national defense," including, again, the restricted data of atomic
energy, if such data are produced or involved in the operation of the
project. This, in effect, is merely the reaffirmation, with respect to the
data of atomic energy, of the right federal departments have always
had to regulate their internal affairs as regards security; to prescribe
terms and conditions with which their contractors must comply; to
prescribe with respect to any information within their purview and for
their own employees "the persons entitled to receive" such information.
It is evident, also, that despite the restrictions of the Atomic Energy
Act, th6 Commission has the same power as any other executive de-
partment to control the dissemination of restricted data as regards, its
own officials, employees, contractors, or recipients of any of its funds
in connection with a research "arrangement" entered into pursuant to
Section 3.
It should be reemphasized that under the interpretation here pro-
posed, section 1(d) of the Espionage Act does not apply to information
produced in the course of wholly private research. Such information is
subject, however, to all the applicable provisions of Section 10 of the
Atomic Energy Act. As a result no federal agency-including the
Services and the Commission-may regulate how restricted informa-
tion produced in the course of private research may be disseminated or
who may receive it. Any research which is supported, even partially,
by federal funds is not, it will be recalled, included within the category
of private research.
While the agency supplying the funds has the right to stipulate the
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conditions under which persons may be entitled to receive the data
produced in or used in the course of research supported in part or in
whole by federal funds, it would be extremely unfortunate for the
military departments to have one policy and the Commission another.
The consequences of a policy of rigid compartmentalization by the
military departments on the one hand and a more liberal policy fol-
lowed by the Commission on the other can be readily foreseen. If the
War Department, for example, should permit only a very limited
group in any given federally-financed project to have access to re-
stricted data, and the Commission on a similar project permits all the
scientists concerned to have access to relevant data, the effect wI be
to permit each department of the government to interpret the Atomic
Energy Act to suit its individual purposes.
To meet this dilemma, the Commission will no doubt find it desirable
to formulate policies with respect to the control of information ap-
plicable to the conduct of all research under contract with non-federal
groups which bind all federal departments. So far as the military are
concerned, such policies would undoubtedly be evolved jointly in con-
sultation between the Commission and the Military Liaison Com-
mittee, and failing agreement, by referring the issues to the President.
In this manner, a consistent and homogeneous information policy for
research in atomic energy would be attained and the worst of the evils
mentioned above avoided. To assure compliance with these policies,
and accompanying regulations, it might be desirable for the President
to issue an executive order directing all departments to make their
atomic energy research contracts conform to models put forth by the
Commission.
CONCLUSION
It might appear at first glance that restrictions on intercourse among
scientists, even in those matters relating to fundamental research and
the laws of nature, do not signify greatly for the maintenance of those
political freedoms we regard as the most precious part of our heritage.
But even a hasty analysis reveals that no such conclusion is justified.
The provisions under discussion cannot be viewed as isolated phe-
nomena; they are significant primarily as symptoms. For the reason
which has prompted this assault on a citadel of freedom firmly estab-
lished for centuries is more important than the assault itself. This
reason, of course, is fear for the nation's security in a world which has
mastered the technology of instantaneous mass annihilation.
If national safety is now held to require a radical abridgement of the
freedom of communication among scientists, it may be held to require
the abridgement of other freedoms as well. For if wars are total and the
threat of destruction absolute, is there any stopping point short of total
preparedness and absolute supervision over all activities which threaten
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the state? The feverish images already invoked in the discussions of
the control of atomic energy give a foretaste of possible legislation.
Atomic bombs can be smuggled in suitcases and assembled clandes-
tinely in sizes to destroy a metropolis. Wars in our age being ideolog-
ical as well as national, we must guard as vigilantly against the fifth
column as against external dangers. Fears of this sort feed on one an-
other. Unless they can be checked at the source, they must inevitably
evoke repressive measures which will go far beyond the interdiction of
scientific communication.
If we are straining every nerve to keep from our suspected enemy
weapons we fear he may use to destroy us, we are hardly likely to tole-
rate the dissemination among us of doctrines even remotely identified
with his ideology. If one traitor can engineer the death of millions, the
procedural safeguards which protect the accused from unjustified
punishment must be relaxed lest that one guilty man go free. If we are
unable to move effectively against external dangers, in our fear and
frustration we will be liable to the temptations of witch-hunting at
home.
If this prognosis is correct, the information section of the Atomic
Energy Act is principally significant as symptom and warning. So long
as the terrible danger of national destruction persists, clearly we must
take such measures as we can to protect against it. But we must
recognize at the same time the dangers to the fundamental values of
our system which are implicit in an uncritical policy of placing imme-
diate security considerations before everything else. If we are deter-
mined to do our utmost to preserve individual freedoms, we will
scrutinize all measures which purport to serve security purposes at
the expense of individual liberty, and reject those which do not appear
to be essential and well-designed to serve their intended purpose.
While we must accept the basic proposition that we should have all
the controls over atomic energy which contribute to our security, this
does not mean that we are not justified in asking pointed questions
about the nature and the probable effect of each of the specific controls
proposed.
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